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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joshua Aaron Wickham appeals from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction, Order
Retaining Jurisdiction, and Commitment. During the trial, Mr. Wickham made a motion for
mistrial after his sister, Myriah Wickham, implied that Mr. Wickham had a serious drug
addiction that was close to killing him. Although a possible limiting instruction was brought up
by the district court, the district court neither struck the improper testimony nor provided a
limiting instruction. Mr. Wickham asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for
mistrial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 14, 2016, an Information was filed charging Mr. Wickham with eluding a peace
officer, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or other drugs, and
driving without privileges. (R., pp.48-49.) Mr. Wickham initially entered guilty pleas to the
eluding and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence charges. (R., p.66.) However,
after the district court rejected the binding plea agreement, Mr. Wickham chose to withdraw his
guilty pleas. (R., p.67.) An Information, Part II, was filed charging Mr. Wickham with a
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.81-82.)
The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.183- 194.) During the trial, Mr. Wickham made a
motion for mistrial after his sister, Myriah Wickham, made statements about his prior drug use.
(Tr., p.261, L.5 – p.265, L.22.)1 The motion for mistrial was denied. (Tr., p.265, Ls.23-25.)

1

For ease of reference, the transcript of the first two days of trial (February 7-8, 2016) will be
cited as “Tr.” All remaining transcripts will be cited with a “Tr.” notation followed by the date
of the transcript.
1

Ultimately, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts.

(R., pp.229-231.)

Mr. Wickham then entered a guilty plea to the persistent violator enhancement. (Tr. 2/9/17,
p.119, L.22 – p.122, L.18.) He was sentenced to a unified sentence of eight years, with three
years fixed, for the eluding a peace officer charge, as enhanced by the persistent violator charge;
and 180 days each for the two misdemeanor charges. (R., pp.240-243.) The district court
retained jurisdiction over Mr. Wickham and allowed him to participate in the rider program.2
(R., p.241.) Mr. Wickham filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction, Order Retaining Jurisdiction, and Commitment. (R., pp.245-247.)

2

As of the filing of this Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Wickham is still participating in the rider
program.
2

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying the motion for a mistrial?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For A Mistrial

A.

Introduction
The State presented the testimony Myriah Wickham, Mr. Wickham’s sister. In response

to a question from the State, Ms. Wickham noted that she called the police about her brother
“[b]ecuase I would rather my brother be in jail than be dead on the streets.” (Tr., p.264, Ls.1519.)

Ms. Wickham’s response to the State’s question impliedly informed the jury that

Mr. Wickham had a history of substance abuse, so serious that his sister thought he was close to
dying on the streets. Defense counsel immediately objected and made a motion for a mistrial.
The district court denied the motion for a mistrial. Mr. Wickham asserts that the motion for a
mistrial was erroneously denied.

B.

Standard Of Review
Mr. Wickham asserts that, following State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the standard

of review for motions for mistrial is unclear.3 Previously, Idaho courts have effectively review
denials of motions for mistrial de novo. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal
case, the “abuse of discretion” standard is a misnomer. The
standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our
focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a
3

The Field standard has been referenced in post-Perry cases by Idaho appellate courts. See
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 68 (2011). However, it does not appear that the specific
question of whether Perry altered the burden of proof has been addressed.
4

mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
Id. (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003) (quoting State v. Shepherd, 124
Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983))).
However, for alleged errors for which there was a timely objection, Mr. Wickham only
has the duty to prove that an error occurred, “at which point the State has the burden of
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
The Perry Court noted only two objections to this standard: when there is a structural defect or
when the jury reached its verdict based upon erroneous instruction. Id. at 227-228.
As such, there are two competing standards of review and it is unclear whether
Mr. Wickham has to burden to prove that the failure to grant a motion for mistrial constituted
reversible error or if he only has to prove that an error occurred and the burden then shifts to the
State to prove that the erroneously admitted testimony did not contribute to the verdict.
Regardless, error is harmless and not reversible if the reviewing court is convinced “beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. at
221.

C.

The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For A Mistrial
Mr. Wickham asserts that the district court erred in denying the motion for mistrial

because the erroneously admitted testimony deprived him of a fair trial. A motion for a mistrial
is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that “[a] mistrial may be declared upon motion of
the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or
conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the

5

defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 29.1(a); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996).
Mr. Wickham asserts that the district court erred in failing to grant a mistrial.
Prior to the start of trial, the State conceded that the portion of Ms. Wickham’s phone call
to the police regarding her brother’s past drug use should be redacted if the audio was played to
the jury. (R., p.176.) Although, at that time, the State did not specifically express that the
evidence should be redacted because it was not relevant and overly prejudicial, it is clearly
implied that these were the reasons for offering to redact this portion of the audio. (R., pp.175176.)
On the first day of trial, the audio recording was again discussed and the State noted that:
There are a number of statements that Myriah Wickham says on those
audios that the State believes would be prejudicial and has asked her not to
indicate those things on the record, has redacted those statements out, in that
regards: The warrant she speaks of, the fact that he was on probation out of
Mountain Home, prior drug usage, associating with junkies, as she refers to it.
(Tr., p.17, Ls.1-8.)

The prosecution later confirmed that the investigator would advise

Ms. Wickham that she could not talk about Mr. Wickham’s prior criminal history or prior drug
use. (Tr., p.26, Ls.3-7.) The prosecutor continued, “the State is only going to elicit very limited
information, because my concerns are she’s going to say something to the effect of, ‘Well, the
reason I know he was on drugs that day is because he is always on drugs.’ So that is why I have
instructed her that she cannot talk about prior drug history or usage, but only limit it to that day.”
(Tr., p.26, Ls.10-17.)
Despite the State’s efforts to keep the prejudicial information out, Ms. Wickham testified
that she had “asked my brother not to come over until he was sober again.” (Tr., p.261, Ls. 7-9.)
Her testimony continued:
Q. Did you want an officer to respond to your location?

6

A. Yes.
Q. And why is that?
A. I didn’t want to go home, not knowing who was going to be as my house that day.
Q. Okay. And why did you give them information about this blue Chevy Lumina?
A. I guess that was the only thing that I could use against my brother that they would
have a reasonable reason to go to my location.
Q. Okay. Were you creating a story to –
A. No.
Q. – call the police? What do you mean by that information?
A. I mean I can’t talk about my brother’s past.
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY [The Prosecutor]:
Q. And I’m not asking about anything previous, but why is it that you wanted to tell
them about this vehicle?
A. Because I would rather my brother be in jail than be dead on the streets. And I knew
that the vehicle had false –
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I’m going to object. Can we take this up outside the presence
of the jury?
(Tr., p.263, L.20 – p.264, L.23.)
Defense counsel made a motion for mistrial. (Tr., p.265, Ls.5-22.) The district court
promptly denied the motion, briefly discussed that a limiting instruction may be an option, and
then had a discussion with Ms. Wickham. (Tr., p.265, L.23 – p.266, L.7.) The district court
asked Ms. Wickham if she was told there were certain things she could not say during her
testimony and Ms. Wickham acknowledged that was true. (Tr., p.266, Ls.12-16.) The district

7

court then clarified that, “[a]nd was one of them what you just said about rather finding him in
jail than dead on the streets?” (Tr., p.266, Ls.17-19.) Ms. Wickham again acknowledged that
was correct, but noted that she felt she had to answer the question “the only way I can.”
(Tr., p.266, Ls.20-22.) The district court reminded Ms. Wickham that she should not “volunteer
information that [she] was told [she] could not talk about . . .” (Tr., p.269, Ls.6-8.) After a
discussion about the direction of the remainder of Ms. Wickham’s testimony, the jury was
returned and testimony resumed. (Tr., p.267, L.8 – p.269, L.17.) At no time was the testimony
stricken or a limiting instruction provided. (Tr., p.269, Ls.11-21.)
As evidenced by the State’s efforts to keep the evidence out and the district court’s
admonishment of the witness, the admission of the prejudicial evidence was clearly error. The
State has the duty to prove that erroneous admission of the evidence was harmless. Perry, 150
Idaho at 227. Mr. Wickham asserts that the State will be unable to prove the error was harmless
as it likely contributed to the verdict in his case.
Alternatively, Mr. Wickham asserts that the error amounts to reversible error because the
prejudicial evidence likely had a continuing impact on the trial. Ms. Wickham’s testimony
informed the jury that her brother had a history of drug abuse, so severe that she worried he
would end up “dead on the streets” if she did not do something about his behavior. Clearly the
State had already anticipated the prejudicial nature of this information and had taken great
lengths to keep it from the jury. While this information would be prejudicial in any setting, it is
especially so in a case that is based on weak identification evidence.
The case presented to the jury was a close one. There were no witnesses that could
definitively tie Mr. Wickham to the vehicle eventually located by police or place him as the
driver of the vehicle.

8

The State’s first witness was Officer Haynie, the officer that responded to
Ms. Wickham’s call to police. (Tr., p.171, L.1 – p.255, L.6.) Officer Hynie testified that while
patrolling the area he noticed a blue Chevy Lumina, with two individuals inside, and 2C plates.
(Tr., p.181, L.21 – p.182, L.12.) He was not able to observe the plate number other that the
county designation. (Tr., p.242, Ls.4-8.) He activated his overhead lights and the vehicle sped
away, leading Officer Haynie on a high speed chase that he eventually had to discontinue after
the pursuit became too dangerous. (Tr., p.182, L.21 – p.190, L.19.)
Just over ten minutes after he stopped pursuing the vehicle, dispatch informed Officer
Haynie that there was a report of vehicle that had stopped at a nearby business; it was believed to
be the same vehicle he had been pursuing. (Tr., p.202, L.12 – p.203, L.10.) Officer Haynie
located the vehicle and determined that it was also a blue Chevy Lumina with 2C plates.
(Tr., p.205, Ls.7-19.) Mr. Wickham was eventually found nearby. (Tr., p.206, L.19 – p.207,
L.11.) Although there was evidence to tie the vehicle to other individuals (license plates and the
registration) Officer Haynie did not provide testimony tying Mr. Wickham to ownership of the
vehicle or any of the vehicle’s contents. (Tr., p.244, L.16 – p.249, L.10.)
Ms. Wickham not only testified about her phone call to police, but also noted that the car
in State’s Exhibits 6-12 was different that the one she had seen her brother in; his car was newer,
lighter in color, and did not have damage. (Tr., p.274, L.2 – p.276, L.15.)
The State’s next witness, Brian Arey, testified that a man had come into the shop he
worked in and asked to change his clothes. (Tr., p.289, L.15 – p.295, L.25.)

However,

Mr. Arey did not believe that the man who came into the store was Mr. Wickham. (Tr., p.299,
Ls.6-22, p.302, L.23 – p.304, L.18.)
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Sophie Bradford, testified that she had seen the blue Chevy Lumina drive up to her
location and two individuals exit and run away. (Tr., p.340, L.5 – p.348, L.5.) However, due to
the suppression of her pervious identification, she was not allowed to identify the person she
believed was driver of the vehicle to the jury. (R., pp.123-131.)
If Mr. Wickham was not proven to be the driver of the vehicle, he could not be convicted
of any of the charges.

While there was some circumstantial evidence, no witness could

definitively place Mr. Wickham in the car or identify him as the driver. As such, the case was
close.
Hearing that a defendant has a serious drug addiction is not only prejudicial, but in this
case it deprived Mr. Wickham of a fair trial. When viewed in the context of the full record, the
improper testimony likely had a continuing impact on the trial.

The jury had to weigh the

evidence against Mr. Wickham and, in this case, the evidence was not overwhelming. Further,
the jury was never informed that it could not consider Ms. Wickham’s statements, because
testimony was not struck and there was no limiting instruction. 4 Therefore, the jury evaluated
the evidence through a lens tainted by information that Mr. Wickham was a drug addict. It is
probable that a jury would not evaluate the State’s weak evidence in the same way as a jury that
had not been exposed to the prejudicial information that Mr. Wickham had been previously using
controlled substances and that his addiction had become so severe that his family was worried
about it resulting in his death.
As such, there is a great danger that the jury considered Ms. Wickham’s statements about
her brother’s deadly drug use to his detriment, that it had a continuing impact on the trial, may

4

Defense counsel did not request either a limiting instruction or the striking of the testimony.
Presumably, those requests were not made because counsel believed that the error could not be
cured and that declaring a mistrial was the only possible remedy.
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have contributed to the verdict, and, ultimately, deprived Mr. Wickham of his right to a fair trial.
It was error for the district court to not declare a mistrial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wickham respectfully requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his
case remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 28th day of November, 2017.

____________/s/_____________
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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